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Abstracts 
Management buyout is considered as an effective way to mitigate the agency 
problems and the conflicts between shareholders and managers in a company. 
Therefore it is always an important option for the firms' restructure to improve the 
performance. MBO has become a choice for Chinese enterprises since the late 
century. However, the effects of MBO in China are still unclear due to the short time 
period. 
This thesis analyzes the MBO issue using a much more complete data including 79 
sample firms and a longer performance record from 1997 to 2006 to provide more 
insights into this issue. First we find that smaller companies with a higher ROA and a 
diversified shareholding are more likely to become the MBO targets. Then we analyze 
the MBO transaction process and find a significant underbidding problem. The NAV 
pricing method required by the government only considers the stock value of the 
company but overlooked the future growth, which is unreasonable. However we find 
even based on this simple criterion, the pricing in MBO transfers still tends to give 
managers a great discount. The pricing rate is generally determined by the transaction 
style, the regional economy marketization level and ROA. In the performance 
analysis of MBO firms, by Difference in Difference estimation, we could not find 
significant improvement for MBO firms, no matter compared with common 
non-MBO firms or compared with other M&A firms. The expense rate of MBO firms 
even overcomes that of the non-MBO matching firms after MBO. So MBO in China 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
Management buyout (MBO) is a popular way of corporate restructuring during the 
1980s in the western countries. After many practices in European and American 
countries, MBO has become a hot topic in transitional economies such as China, 
especially from last decade of the century. However from the beginning of the 
21 St century, Chinese scholars began to criticize whether MBO could really improve 
the management efficiency of firms, and whether MBO deals will benefit internal 
managers abnormally. Some scholars argue that MBO in China is not an effective way 
to improve corporate governance, but becomes a method for managers of state-owned 
enterprises to acquire the enterprises from the government at a very low price. 
Currently most of the existing literature only covers MBO cases in the western 
countries, such as US and UK, where there is a complete legal system to monitor the 
firm's acquisitions and a mature capital market. However, in China now, it is still far 
from having both an efficient legal system and a mature capital market. Therefore, it 
will be meaningful to analyze the MBO practice in China to see whether the popular 
theory in the developed countries could be applied to this transitional economy 
By definition, MBO has the following core characteristics: first, the full or partial 
transfer of a firm's assets, embodied in operational business units, to a new company 
established for the purpose of running them; second, a comparatively high reliance on 
debt~of different forms-in the financial structure of the new company; thirdly, the 
relative concentration of equity ownership, with managers and some participating 
institutions typically holding substantial voting blocks (M. Wright et al (1994)). 
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The agency problem exists in the typical divorce of beneficial ownership from effective 
control in firms with a diffuse set of shareholder-principals. The diluted or even 
nonexistent equity interest of managers may bring departures from profit-maximizing 
behavior to the detriment of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In a joint stock 
company managers are optimizing a different objective function from the company's 
owners. The owners' objective is to maximize the current value of the profit stream 
(hence maximizing the share price) whereas a manager's objective function may 
include power, status, prestige, organization size, and earnings. The separation of 
ownership from control creates an environment in which there is an asymmetry of 
information problem in the favor of managers. Combined with the free-rider problem 
associated with dispersed shareholders holding a diverse portfolio of equity holdings, 
then there is a situation where managers can undertake decisions that may be in 
conflict with owners' interests. 
Given the agency problem and the free-rider problem, MBO is widely believed to be a 
device to reduce the agency costs of exercising control over corporate assets. An MBO 
is expected to realign managers' incentives with those of the owners because they 
become the owners or have a substantial ownership stake in the firm. A large stake of 
the firm's assets will be transferred to a new company established by the managers, 
for the purpose of running the firm. Thus the managers and owners become the same 
to some extent. So the above problems are supposed to be alienated and the firms' 
performance should be improved. 
To summarize, literatures in MBOs have pointed out four kinds of motivations for 
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MBOs. 
(i) Efficiency gains through improved operations and reductions in agency costs 
(ii) Savings from reduced corporate income tax liabilities 
(iii) Wealth transfers from pre-buyout bondholders 
(iv) Wealth transfers from employees 
In Chapter II，I will first review several lines of literatures from research of the USA 
and Europe, along with some literature by Chinese scholars. In Chapter III I will try to 
sum up some systematic differences between MBOs in China and those in developed 
countries. Some introduction of the data that I used is given in Chapter IV. In Chapter 
V I will present the empirical results from my analysis. Finally Chapter VI is a 
conclusion for the study in China's MBOs. 
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Chapter II. Literatures Reviews 
There is a large literature on MBO, most of which are based on data experience of 
western countries. Generally the studies on MBO mainly focus on two subjects. 
The first subject is to study the MBO transaction process. They want to find how the 
managers will behave when they are facing the conflicts of selling the companies they 
run to themselves. They try to find whether the transactions are fair to other 
shareholders and how other measures could be taken to ensure the interest of other 
shareholders. 
In MBO transactions, managers may face special interest conflict when they are 
selling the company to themselves. Easterwood et al (1994) provides some analysis 
on the conflict of managers' interests by focusing on the role of institutional and 
market factors in controlling managerial conflicts of interest. Their examination of 
abnormal returns associated with management buyouts reveals that pre-buyout 
stockholders earn larger abnormal returns in contested buyouts compared to buyouts 
facing no competing or hostile bids. In contrast, buyouts accompanied by non-bidding 
forms of competition earn abnormal returns which are no greater than those facing no 
attempts to control management buyouts. The overall conclusion of this study is that 
explicit bidding competition in management buyouts leads to higher stockholder 
returns, higher offer revisions and may be an effective means of controlling buyout 
offer prices. On the other hand, alternative control mechanisms, such as litigation, 
negotiation, and threat of competition have little effect on stockholder returns. 
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Furthermore, stockholder returns in buyouts with this implicit competition fare no 
better than do stockholders of buyouts without any explicit or implicit competition. 
Stock price reaction could reflect the public reaction to the MBO announcement. Lee 
(1992) focuses on the stock price reaction to MBO proposals which were withdrawn 
to determine whether managers typically have some insider information about their 
firms' value. He found positive and significant average cumulative abnormal returns 
existed for periods that include both the proposal and withdrawal announcements for 
samples of firms with withdrawn buyout proposals. These positive returns are 
attributable to firms that received other acquisition bids. His tests shows that 
managers of firms who withdrew their buyout proposals were at least as likely to have 
access to inside information as managers of firms with completed buyouts. His results 
can not support for the hypothesis that MBO proposals reveal inside information 
about firm value, which is inconsistent with the claim that managers commonly 
propose a buyout when they have access to inside information about the firm's value. 
Hite and Vetsuyepens (1989) study another area of possible manager-shareholder 
conflict by examining the returns to shareholders around changes in corporate control 
resulting from MBO of divisions. The feature of this kind of MBO which makes them 
different from common interfirm divestitures is that there is no bargaining between 
buyers and sellers, which will raise the possibility of "managerial self-dealing" at the 
expense of parent company shareholders. 
Their study shows that on average, parent company shareholders do not lose from 
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such asset sales. They found that in the two-day period around divisional buyout 
announcements, parent company shareholders experience abnormal return not 
significantly less than inter-firm divestitures over the same time period. These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that MBOs of divisions represent an efficient 
reallocation of corporate resources and allow parent company stockholders to share in 
the expected benefits from ownership change. 
The other subject that interests the scholars is the performance improvement analysis. 
Since MBO is widely regarded as an improvement to some of the agency problem, it 
is intuitive that MBO should be able to improve firm performance, at least to some 
extent. 
On the issue of productivity, Amess (2002) presents an empirical investigation of the 
productivity effects of UK management buyouts (MBOs) over the period 1986-1997. 
It is the first study to use an augmented production function approach in order to 
determine and quantify the Hicks-neutral productivity, the marginal productivity of 
labor, and the marginal productivity of capital effects of MBOs. The paper analyzes 
productivity of firms using the data of value added, which is the fraction of the market 
value of production that has been added by the company's processes of production, 
administration, selling, and distribution, or the difference between turnover and the 
cost of bought-in materials. The additional novelty is its application of a method 
allowing the productivity effects of the MBO governance structure to impact through 
a Hicks-neutral shift in the production function and through non-neutral, interactive 
effects on production. 
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The results show that for firms with the MBO governance structure, there are 
Hicks-neutral productivity gains; and there is always higher MVP^. In addition, most 
estimates indicate MVP^ is lower for MBO firms. The author attributes this 
inconsistency to the measure of capital employed, i.e. fixed assets. The main findings 
are consistent with that MBO could improve firm-level productivity in the 
post-buyout organization via reduced agency costs, debt bonding, and monitoring. 
Kaplan (1989) studies MBO benefits from another point, tax. This paper estimates the 
value of tax benefits in 76 management buyouts of public companies completed in the 
period 1980 to 1986. The median value of tax benefits, estimated at the time when the 
buyout company goes private, has a lower bound of 21% and an upper bound of 143% 
of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders. The paper also presents evidence on 
the actual taxes paid and debt repayment rates by these companies after the buyout. The 
results in this paper support the hypothesis that tax benefit is an important source of 
the wealth gains in management buyout transactions. 
There are some other research in the unsuccessful MBO samples. Ofek (1994) uses 
unsuccessful management buyouts samples to test whether operation improvements 
after successful MBOs are a result of organizational changes or private information. 
He finds no improved performance in firms with unsuccessful MBOs. Additionally 
the evidence of a change in operating performance is still lacking even if the 
self-selection biases of unsuccessful offers are controlled. The results could support 
that changes in organizational structure could lead to the improved operating 
efficiency observed after successful MBOs. The results are inconsistent with the 
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hypothesis that efficiency gains would have occurred in attempting MBO companies 
regardless of whether MBOs are successful or not, and the hypothesis that MBO is 
motivated by private information that managers have when they bid for the firm. 
Additionally, Wright et al (1996) analyses the factors that lead to management 
buy-out failure using both financial and non-financial information. The evidence is 
consistent with the view that some mechanisms introduced to deal with agency cost 
problems; particularly management incentives and undertaking restructuring activity 
in a timely fashion are associated with a lower probability of failure. Excessive 
leverage and delays in restructuring are associated with a higher probability of failure. 
The discussion first suggests that across the full range of debt proportions to be found in 
the financial structures of enterprises, leverage has a non-linear relationship with the 
likelihood of failure. Lower levels of leverage may be associated with a greater 
propensity to fail because of the weakened pressure to perform which is signaled, while 
very high degrees of leverage may also be associated with higher failure rate as the 
enterprise is unable to service debt repayments. The second focus is monitoring. 
Buy-outs typically involve a wide range of reporting requirements and frequently 
board representation by active investors (Wright, Thompson and Robbie, 1992). 
However, active investors may be faced with severe moral hazard problems which 
make monitoring difficult. Monitoring also involves costs, with there being a 
significant fixed element in these costs irrespective of the nature of the investment. 
The third factor the paper raised is management as owners. In essence, the more 
committed are management and employees to the transaction, the less likely is failure 
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to occur. However, the extent to which equity owning management will be effective in 
enhancing performance depends partly on their access to information at the time of the 
buy-out and partly on their own ability and motivations. The signs on variables which 
measure the extent of wider employee financial involvement are, therefore, somewhat 
ambiguous in models explaining failure. Finally are firm-specific factors. Buy-outs 
emanate from a number of sources, such as divestment from larger groups, family 
firm's receivership and the public sector, which may be related to the probability of 
subsequent failure. However, theoretical expectations about the link between source 
and failure may be ambiguous. 
In the western countries, the consequence of MBO usually is the privatization of the 
company. After that the company quit the stock market and become privately owned 
by managers. Then after years of private control and operation, the managers could 
choose to let the company go public again and sell their shares to earn a premium. 
Wright et al (1994) also studied the longevity and lifecycle of MBO. They found 
significant differences in the longevity between large and small buy-outs. Additionally 
buyouts on privatization from the public sectors and from non-UK parents were to 
have a significantly greater exit rates than buyouts from other sources. The case 
studies support the hypothesis that earlier exit is associated with financing institutions 
being in a relatively stronger position than management and with more rapidly 
changing market conditions for the firm. 
All the above are from the western scholars with an analysis based on data from the 
US or Europe. To understand the Chinese situation, we also need to take a look at the 
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Chinese scholars' literature. Since 2003, MBO has caused a heated debate in China, 
both in the academic field and the public media. 
Yi (2003) provided an empirical study on the MBO of listed firms in China. He used 
event study method to analyze the abnormal returns to shareholders before and after 
the MBO announcement. His result shows that the MBO could not bring any 
wealth-enhancing effect to the common shareholders. And the firm performance right 
after the MBO year is quite poor, with revenue per share, Return of Net Asset and 
Return of Asset all declining. Besides, he also pointed out some problems for MBO in 
China, including the information disclosure and the legal affairs for setting up a legal 
entity for MBO purpose. He also demonstrated the problem of pricing with the 
illustration of several examples like Shenzhen Fangda, Fosu Gufen and 
Tebiandiangong. All the examples show a significant pricing discount for managers 
based on NAV. This paper contains a data sample of 18 MBOs. 
Xu，Cai and Xu (2005) used another data sample of 25 MBOs to approach the issue 
from another angle. They provided an empirical analysis on managerial stockholding 
level and firm performance. The results showed that their ROE and managerial 
shareholding is expressed as a nonlinear cubic equation in 25 listed companies of 
management buyouts in China. If managerial stockholding level is less than 7.50%, it 
will be positively related to corporate performance. If it is between 7.50 and 33.35%, 
managerial stockholding level will be negatively related to corporate performance. If 
it is over 33.35%, managerial stockholding level will intensively be interrelated to 
corporation governance performance as a positive relationship. Therefore MBO may 
11 
not be an assured positive factor to the firms' performance. 
Yang and Su (2006) approached this issue from another different angle. They used 
accounting method and factor study to analyze the performance improvement of 
MBO firms after completing MBO. They use a sample of 16 MBOs happened before 
Dec 2002. They find that without the adjustment of industry influence, MBO can not 
improve the firms' profitability while the debt ratio will increase due to heavy burden 
of debt financing for MBO. When eliminating the industry influence, the short term 
debt ratio will still increase due to the MBO financing. 
He (2006) studied China's listed companies MBO before 2004. He first analyzed the 
chief characteristics of China listed companies MBO, including discount purchase, the 
irregularity of financing, etc. From his study, the average net asset value/ transaction 
price is 2.53, which indicates a severe discounted purchasing of MBO companies. In 
the performance analysis, he uses 42 samples in a time span of 3 years before and 
after MBO year to compare 12 important financial factors of MBO companies. The 
comparison shows that in general the financial performance of MBO companies did 
not significantly improve. Return of equity, return per share and other important 
profitability factors are even declining in the 7 years span. On the other hand, the cost 
factor, debt factor and debt/equity ratio are increasing, meaning that the cost and debt 
burden, and the risk of the MBO companies are increasing. He also studied the 
performance of MBO firms compared with other listed companies. He used the whole 
sample of listed companies as the comparison group. He found that 78.95% of MBO 
companies experienced improvements on return per share that are lower than average. 
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And 86.84% MBO companies experienced lower than average improvements of 
return on equity. All the results showed that MBO could not improve firm 
performance in China. 
Zhang (2004) studied the difference between MBO in China and in the western 
countries. He summarized that the differences mainly lie in the purpose, the condition, 
the source of funding, the pricing mode, the legal system, the portion of controller, the 
government and other active investors or venture capitalists. 
In his study, he could not find any positive correlation between the return from main 
operation and MBO. So MBO could not improve the firm performance. He also found 
that for MBO firms, the net asset value is even decreasing. The only reasonable 
explanation is that managers are trying to lower the NAV to reduce their cost in the 
transactions by some accounting tricks; otherwise it is unexpected for managers to 
buy out a firm whose NAV is decreasing. He also found no wealth effect for the other 
liquid shareholders. 
He concluded that in China, MBO could lead to several problems. First MBO could 
be harmful to other liquid shareholders by giving financing right to the managers; 
second, MBO can not improve the firm performance; third, government plays a 
significant but improper role in MBO; finally the pricing criteria are not fair. 
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Chapter III. Features of MBO in China 
Although MBO is no longer a hot topic in the west, it still catches a lot of attention in 
China. In fact, MBOs in China and developed countries, although share some 
common features, still have a lot of differences: 
3.1 Dichotomy of stock structure 
A significant feature of Chinese MBOs is the dichotomy of the stock shares structure 
of listed companies. For the listed companies in China A stock market, the total stocks 
issued are divided into two separate parts. One is the non-tradable or illiquid shares, 
which consists of shares owned by the state or other legal entities; the other part is the 
tradable or liquid shares, which are shares that could be traded by bidding openly in 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. Since the non-tradable shares could not be 
traded in the open market, their prices are much lower than the stock prices in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. Therefore all the Chinese MBOs are completed not 
on the open market, but on a negotiated block transfer of non-tradable shares. 
Although later in 2005，the government has started the stock reform to deal with the 
liquidity problems of non-tradable shares in the stock market, our MBO companies 
are all acquired by the transfer of non-tradable share. 
3.2 Pre-buyout Ownership structure 
In most developed countries, MBOs are for listed firms. Managers need to buy shares 
of stock from stock market to get the control rights. However, in China, a lot of 
MBOs involve managers buying illiquid stock shares form the state. In most cases, 
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the government sold its shares of state-owned firms to managers to complete buy-outs. 
There comes the question that there is not a clear owner, or shareholder that could 
really stand for the interests of the state. This is especially the case in the late 1990s. 
Thus the MBO transactions may often accompany with the rent-seeking deals of 
regional governors and managers. 
3.3 Buyout styles 
What is more, because there are more regulating powers and monitoring for the listed 
companies, some managers may choose other ways to buy out the listed company 
rather than acquiring the block shares of listed company directly. Instead, they could 
buy out the mother company or the largest shareholder of the listed company (referred 
to as Holding Company below). In fact, a lot of China's listed companies went public 
as subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises, only to raise funds to help the original 
state-owned enterprises. Therefore in many cases, the listed companies and the 
holding companies of the listed company share the same general manager. Moreover, 
the largest shareholder shareholding, or the ownership concentration is very high for 
Chinese listed companies. So in these cases, the general managers of listed company 
could easily choose to buy out the Holding Company where he also is in charge of the 
management. In this way managers could avoid the public monitoring and 
information disclosure. 
For the above reasons, in the negotiation process the managers could have more 
chances to benefit themselves through a larger discount in acquiring the target 
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company. There comes the underbidding phenomenon, in which managers got the 
firm shares at a price rather lower than the real value. That is why many scholars 
criticize that the MBOs in China are some way for managers to occupy the assets of 
the listed companies. 
3.4 MBO consequences 
In the western countries, MBOs often require the managers to propose a takeover 
offer to buy all the shares of the target company in the market. This may cause the 
company to terminate public listing on the stock market and becomes privately owned. 
Then after years, the managers may choose to have the privately-owned company go 
public again in stock market and sell their shares to earn a profit. 
However, in China, no MBO companies will quit from the stock market, and also 
managers are not required to propose to buy all the shares listing. Conversely, after 
MBO, the managers tend to rely on the high dividends generated by the listed 
company to pay back their debt in MBO. In some cases, these high dividends are not 
based on the good performance after MBO, but from the hidden revenue before MBO. 
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Chapter IV. Data Description 
The very first difficulty of Chinese MBO study is that there exist no prepared data for 
the MBO research in China. In CSMAR (China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
Dataset), we could get a database for the block share transfers of listed companies. 
However, it is impossible to find the stories behind the transfer. We could not decide 
whether the transfer involves MBO with the limited information. Also as stated above, 
some MBOs are conducted through the acquisition of block shares of the holding 
company. This kind of information may not be released in the reports of listed 
companies. What added to the difficulty is that because of the severe critiques of the 
public and some scholars, some of the MBO companies choose to hide the 
information from the public by denying the MBO intention or making the MBO 
process and the controlling link too complicated to be understood. 
We first try to approach the problem by analyzing the business news concerning MBO 
because the power of media may be stronger to detect the MBO intentions of 
managers. We use the ChinalnforBank to search for business news involving MBO. 
Later we also use ISOU search engine to search for other MBO news. Reading these 
large amounts of news reports of MBO, we could get a list of companies that were 
preparing or practicing MBO. But unfortunately, the news from various sources is not 
reliable enough, because it is reasonable for reporters to exaggerate the situation to 
attract public attention. Therefore some reported MBO firms may not meet the 
standards. Also some firms that attempt MBO may have the MBO process terminated 
by the government or for other reasons. So we need to verify the information. Then 
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we use other databases such as CSMAR or search engine like Baidu, Google, and 
ISou to search for the related information and the relevant accounting data of the 
company. Finally we could get a total of 79 sample companies that are involved in 
MBO activities. The whole sample could be divided into the following categories: 
1. Direct MBO. The managers of listed companies acquire the non-tradable shares of 
the company to get the control right over the listed companies. 
2. Holding Company MBO. The managers acquire the block shares of the largest 
shareholder of the listed company (Holding Company) in order to get the control over 
listed companies. 
3. Gradual MBO. The managers increase their shares of the listed company little by 
little every year through some kind of inspiring or bonus plan for the managers. For 
example, the managers set up some plan that if the firm performance meets some 
certain criteria, they could get some stock shares as bonus for the management. 
Therefore after years of bonus, the managers could achieve the control position in the 
company. 
4. Subsidiary MBO. Some subsidiary firms of listed companies may be sold out to the 
managers of subsidiary firms for some reason such as the development policy. This 
buyout of subsidiaries does not affect the shareholding structure of listed company. 
But for subsidiaries, they are still MBO transactions. This kind of MBOs often serves 
as the extraction strategy of listed companies. For example, when a listed company 
wants to narrow its business field, it may choose to sell some subsidiary business 
which it decides to quit from. If the shareholding is transferred to their managers, then 
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the subsidiary company is bought out by their managers. 
The above categories are those companies whose MBO information is generally clear 
enough for the research. We also have a category 5 which contains companies that are 
said to involve in MBO, but the details of transactions could not be revealed. 
Finally, category 6 contains companies that intend to exercise MBO but finally 
terminated the MBO due to various reasons. The description statistics is given in 
Table I-l 
[Insert Table I-l here] 
Based on the industry code of CSMAR, we could see the industry distribution of our 
sample in Table 1-2 
[Insert Table 1-2 here] 
In the table, the "percent" shows how many percentage of companies in the industry 
are our MBO samples. We could see a relative high percentage in Agriculture, 
Conglomerates, and Information Technology. 
The stock exchange distribution is given in Table 1-3 
[Insert Table 1-3 here] 
According to the data samples, it is very natural to ask a question what kind of firms 
are more likely to be bought by the managers? To answer this question, we can make 
a two-group comparison to see whether MBO firms have any features. Several 
variables that we are interested in are defined below: 
Total assets is an indicator of firm size 
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ROA=net profits/ total assets, which shows the profitability of firms 
Leverage=long term debts/ total assets, which shows the debt ratio 
To measure the shareholding structure, we first utilize shareholding, which is the 
percent that is held by the largest shareholder. It shows the concentration of the largest 
shareholding. We also use Herfindahl index to measure the relative controlling power 
that the largest shareholder enjoyed. The definition of Relative Power is given below. 
We can see that the higher the Relative Power is, the higher control power the largest 
shareholder has. 
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^Qlative_Power = Shareholding^ -^n^Shareholding^ 
n=l 
We compare MBO firms with the whole sample of listed firms in China. Since year 
2003 witnessed the largest number of MBO deals, we just compared the figures in 
year 2002 before most MBOs occurred. Both t-test and Wilcoxon test are done. The 
main results are given in Table 1-4. 
[Insert Table 1-4 here] 
It is very interesting to find some significant differences in the Wilcoxon tests. The 
results show that besides the industry concentration in manufacturing, MBO firms 
also are smaller in size compared with the whole listed firm samples. The largest 
shareholding is relatively lower and the Relative Power is also lower for MBO firms. 
This shows that MBO firms may have a more diversified shareholding structure. All 
these provide the managers with possibility to acquire the target company at a 
reasonable cost without acquiring a too big portion of the company. And the ROA 
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performance is better than average. That means the MBO target companies on average 
earn more than other listed companies, which provides managers with incentives to 
acquire the company. 
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Chapter V. Empirical Results 
In this section we will present the empirical results of our MBO studies using the 
above data collected. According to the previous research, the empirical results mainly 
focus on two subjects. First is the underbidding problem, which demonstrates whether 
the pricing of stock transfers in MBOs complies with the government regulations, and 
is fair to all the other shareholders, especially for the original owners of the company. 
Second is the performance analysis, i.e. whether MBOs could really solve the agency 
problem and improve the firm's performance in the long run. Next we will show the 
results in these two aspects. 
5.1 Underbidding Analysis 
Underbidding problem is the most criticized issue among the Chinese scholars. So our 
first question is whether there exists a significant underbidding problem. To determine 
the underbidding rate, we need a benchmark for calculation of the value of the 
company. Theoretically when we want to decide whether the investment in a project 
or a company is worthwhile we need to calculate the NPV and compare it with the 
payment capital. To find the exact value of a company we need to predict the future 
cash flow and convert it into the present value to decide the price of the company. It is 
rather difficult and complicated. Of course if we assume that the capital market is 
efficient, the stock price could to some extent reflect the predicted future cash flows 
of the company and therefore the market value could be used as approximation of the 
value of the company. However, in China, especially in the MBO cases, the question 
becomes simpler. In the regulations for state-owned shareholders, the transfer price of 
state-owned shares is subject to Net Asset Value, Return on Equity, Stock Price, and 
reasonable P/E ratio, etc. but "no less than the Net Asset Value". Although the 
regulations do state a set of factors to be considered in transfers, in the real practice, 
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especially in MBOs when the managers could manipulate the whole process, the 
lower bound of this regulation, "Net Asset Value", is often used as the only criteria. 
The critiques often refer to a transfer price lower than the NAV as an "occupation of 
the state interest". The managers also claim that the transfer is legal because the price 
is "no less" than NAV. Because of these reasons, we could first use the Net Asset 
Value as a benchmark to see whether underbidding exists in the MBO process. To see 
the real underbidding in MBO transactions, we tried to calculate the pricing for each 
MBO transaction. The pricing can be calculated in these two categories of MBO: 
1) If the managers buy block stock shares of listed companies directly from other 
share holders. In this case the pricing could be calculated from this: 
Pricing=Average Paid Price per Share/ Net Asset Value per Share at the MBO Year 
Also we need to notice that due to the different stock market structure of China, these 
block shares are categorized as illiquid "Legal Person Shares". So the Average Paid 
Price per Share is quite different from the Stock Price in the stock market which could 
only be applied to transferable stocks. 
We can pick up an example to explain the calculation. Guangdong Media Electric 
Appliances Limited Company (Stock code 000527) is a home used electric appliance 
producer headquartered in Guangdong Shunde. In the annual report of 1999, the 
largest shareholder is Media Holding Co. Ltd which held 26.32% of Media Electric. 
Media Holding Co. Ltd stood for the Shunde government to control Media Electric. In 
the year 2000，another company Meituo Holding Co. Ltd was set up for the purpose 
of MBO, in which the Board Chairman of Media Electric Co. Ltd held 25% of shares 
as the largest shareholder. Another senior executive director of Media Electric Co. Ltd 
held 10.3% of Meituo Holding as the second largest shareholder. Totally 78% of 
Meituo Holding was held by managers in Media Electric Co. Ltd. Therefore it was 
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controlled by the mangers of Media Electric Co. Ltd. On April IQth，2000; Meituo 
Holding Co. Ltd bought 35,184,000 shares of Media Electric Co. Ltd from Media 
Holding Co. Ltd at 2.95 RMB per share. On Dec 2000，Meituo Holding Com. 
Ltd bought another 724,303,310,000 shares of Median Electric at 3 RMB per share 
from Media Holding Co. Ltd. After this, Meituo Holding Co. Ltd, controlled by the 
managers in Media Electric Co. Ltd, held 22.19% of Media Electric. Therefore it is a 
management buyout case. Here the average price is calculated by: 
/ce = (2.95*35,184,000 + 3 *724,303,310,000)/(35,184,000 + 724,303,310,000) 
=2.98RMB 
And the Net Asset Value per Share for Media Electric Co. Ltd in 2000 was 4.07 RMB. 
So with our definition the pricing rate is calculated as: 
？vicing = 2.98/4.07 = 0.7322 
2) If the managers buy block stock shares of main shareholder companies of listed 
companies (refereed to as Holding Company below). In this case, due to the limitation 
of information, it is difficult to decide the exact price per share the managers paid for 
the share of Holding Company. However, we could follow the similar definition as 
above. The pricing can be defined as below. Suppose the managers and related party 
paid M amount of money and acquired P1 percent of the Holding Company, while the 
Holding Company was holding P2 percent of the listed (target) company which has a 
Net Asset Value of N at the MBO year. Then: 
Pricing=M/ (P1*P2*N) 
Noticeably, here we use the net asset value of the listed company controlled by the 
Holding Company as the substitutes for the net asset of Holding Company. The reason 
for this kind of substitutes is as follows. First, given the legal system and accounting 
efficiency of China, the accounting method of net asset value is flexible even for the 
listed companies. For Holding Companies that are unlisted, the information on net 
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asset value is inaccurate or even untraceable. So calculation of pricing based on the 
net asset of Holding Company is almost impossible. Second is the characteristic of the 
Chinese listed companies. When going public, the company often first set up a 
subsidiary company and put the entire valuable and profitable asset into the subsidiary 
company. Then they had the subsidiary go public, while the original company with 
very few assets became the Holding Company. As a result, Holding Company often is 
only a shell which contains very little asset. The main value of this shell company is 
the control right over listed company. It is often the case that managers of listed 
company also serve as managers in the Holding company. The only purpose that 
managers buy out the Holding Company is to gain control over listed companies at a 
relatively lower price without exposure to the public monitoring and auditing on the 
listed companies. So the net asset of listed company is the main target and we just 
calculate based on the net asset of listed company. 
Also here we use an example to show the calculation process for this kind of MBO. 
Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Co. Ltd (referred to as Yutong Bus below) is a bus 
manufacture in Henan province. Before 2003, the state-owned Yutong Group Co. Ltd 
was the largest shareholder of Yutong Bus Co. Ltd, with a shareholding of 17.19%. 
Shanghai Yutong was a company held by the managers of Yutong Bus Co. Ltd. In 
2001，Shanghai Yutong signed a contract with Zhengzhou State-owned Asset 
Administration Bureau (referred as Zhengzhou SAAB below) to buy 89.8% 
shareholding of Yutong Group Co. Ltd from Zhengzhou SAAB. This was the 
managers' first attempt to buy out Yuyong Group Co. Ltd to gain control right over 
Yutong Bus. However, the transaction could not get the permission from the Ministry 
of Finance of China, and the MBO was terminated. Later in 2003，Shanghai Yutong 
sued Zhengzhou Finance Bureau for failing to return the funds paid for stock transfers. 
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The Zhengzhou Court permitted a public auction for the related stocks shares of 
Yutong Group Co. Ltd. However, the auction news was only posted on Zhengzhou 
Daily, a very local newspaper with almost no influence countrywide. As a result, only 
two companies went for the bid. Shanghai Yutong successfully bought 90% of Yutong 
Group Co. Ltd with 148,500,000 RMB. The other company, Yutong Development, 
which was also controlled by managers of Yutong Bus, got 10% of Yutong Group Co. 
Ltd with 16,500,000 RMB. Since the legal adjudicate by the Court should be prior to 
administrative decisions of regional government, finally the MBO was completed. In 
this case, given that the total shares of Yutong Bus are 136,723,660, and the Net Asset 
Value per Share of Yutong Bus at the end of 2003 was 6.243 RMB, the net asset value 
of Yutong Bus held by Yutong Group is: 
NAV _ Group = 136723 660 * 6.243 *17.19% = 146727962 
So by our definition before, the pricing rate for this MBO case is 
Pr icing = (148500000 +16500000) /(100% * 146717962) 
=1.125 
With the above definition we could calculate the Pricing variable for the MBO 
companies. However the calculation is still impossible for some companies due to the 
lack of enough information. Moreover，since some literatures have shown that the 
MBO Company may try to hide revenues before MBO and reduce the Net Asset 
Value of the company to lower the cost for managers to acquire the company. So, to 
mitigate the possible accounting tricks, we will modify some of our definition. Next 
we use the average of the Net Asset Value per Share in the year before MBO and the 
MBO year to replace the Net Asset Value per Share in the MBO year. The pricing is 
thus redefined as below, suppose the MBO year is t 
In situation 1) discussed above: 
Pricing = AVERAGE PAID PRICE per Share I 洲AVPS卜、+ NAVPS) 
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In situation 2) discussed above: 
Pr icing = + )] 
Here the intuition is, if managers want to buy out the company, the company should 
have a good performance history. So our intuition tells us that the net asset value of 
the company should be increasing at least near the MBO years. If we use the new 
average NAV as the benchmark, the denominator should be less than before, and the 
new pricing rate should be higher than the previous definition. Finally we got 46 
sample firms for this part's analysis. 
Then we can do the t-test to test whether the pricing rate is approximately one. If 
pricing is not significantly below one, we can say the pricing is reasonable and 
complies with the government regulation. If not, there should be an underbidding 
problem exists. The result is shown in Table II-1. 
[Insert Table II-1 here] 
From the result we can see, we could reject the null hypothesis even at the 1% level. 
The mean of Pricing significantly falls below 1. Considering that the simple t-test 
required variables to follow a normal distribution. Here this assumption may not be 
true due to the limited sample size. Similarly we also could do a non parametric sign 
test to test the median of Pricing. The result is given in Table II-2 
[Insert Table II-2 here] 
The result rejected the hypothesis at the 5% level. Therefore the median value of 
Pricing is still below one. To further test our result, we also did a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. The result is given in Table II-3. 
[Insert Table II-3 here] 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test still rejects the hypothesis that Pricing=l at the 5% 
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level. As a result from the three different tests, we could conclude that the 
underbidding problem really existed. In the MBO transactions, the managers could 
acquire the listed company with a price rather lower than the actual Net Asset Value 
of the target listed company, which is against government regulations. When we use 
the average net asset as the benchmark we could mitigate some of the financial tricks 
by the managers. On average, the managers could acquire the target company at a 
twenty-percent discount even only based on net asset value of the target company. 
Moreover, if we assume that the stock market is efficient, the stock price could reflect 
the valuation of the company. Here we also used the stock price as another benchmark 
of the valuation process. We could just change the NAVPS in the above definition to 
the closing stock price of the company in the end of the MBO year. Then we could 
re-calculate Pricing based on stock prices. 
We could also do similar t-test, sign test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test on 
Pricing一Stock，the result is given in Table 11-4’ 5, 6 
[Insert Table II-4 here] 
[Insert Table II-5 here] 
[Insert Table II-6 here] 
The t-test result rejects the null hypothesis even at the 1% level. We could see the new 
Pricing-Stock variable has a mean at 0.337, which is also far away from the mean of 
Pricing. Although various studies have shown that due to the illiquid nature of 
non-transferable shares, the transfer price should be much lower than the liquid shares 
on the stock exchange, the average discount is only around 20-30%. Therefore the 
value of non-tradable stocks should be around 0.7-0.8 multiplied by the tradable stock 
prices. Even taking this into consideration, we find that the mean of Pricing—Stock 
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should be around 0.421-0.481, which still demonstrates a significant discount in MBO 
pricing. Therefore the underbidding problem still exists based on the stock price 
benchmark. 
Academically, the valuation process during the merger and acquisition should 
consider various factors such as P/E, cash flow, net asset value, net present value, 
stock price, along with the industry future. In China, due to the lack of a mature legal, 
accounting and supervision system, the government could only set the Net Asset 
Value as the basic benchmark for block transfers to try to make the transaction fair 
and transparent. However, from our discussion, even this least effective way of 
valuation still has many ways for the rent-seeking activities of managers. Even based 
on the net asset value benchmark, the MBO managers are still enjoying a great 
discount. Since the benchmark of net asset value is what the Chinese government put 
on the MBO stock transfers, in the next analysis we still use this second definition of 
Pricing based on the average net asset value as our main research focus. Next we will 
try to find what factors could affect this pricing and valuation process during MBO. 
5.1.1 Transaction Variables 
We could easily pick up some variables concerning transactions. We could define 
these variables as Transaction Variables. 
First is the transaction style of MBO. As previously discussed, the MBO could be 
completed through direct transfer of listed company shares, or by acquiring the 
Holding Company of listed companies. Here the TRA_STYLE is defined like this: if 
the MBO process is by the acquisition of block stock shares of listed company 
directly, TRA_STYLE=0; if the MBO is by the acquisition of block stock shares of 
Holding Company, TRA_STYLE=1. 
Second, we can test whether underbidding rate may be affected by timing factor, 
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because as MBO was being criticized more and more by the public, the Ministry of 
Treasury of China once stopped to permit any MBO related activities in March 2003. 
Therefore, for MBO before and after this point, the pricing and underbidding rate may 
exhibit some differences. Here we use TIMING factor to distinguish this timing 
difference. TIMING =1 if MBO occurred before March 2003 when the new 
regulation came out; TIMING=0 if MBO occurred after March 2003. 
Third we could analyze the impact of share type before MBO on the underbidding 
rate. It has been widely criticized that MBO is a convenient way for state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) managers to acquire the companies at a rather low prices to benefit 
themselves, because the owner of SOEs is the state. It is a kind of suppositional 
"ownership" that no one, even the local government could not control the activities of 
SOEs. Only the managers know exactly how the company works and could almost 
decide every activity for the company. Therefore MBOs in SOE nearly mean the 
managers "sold" the enterprises to themselves. So the underbidding problem for SOE 
should be higher (Pricing variable should be smaller). However in other public owned 
enterprises, since the previous shareholders will take up the responsibility of bargain 
and will not let managers earn a great discount in MBO, the underbidding should be 
less (Pricing variable should be bigger). Here we use SOE一SHARE variable to define 
whether acquired stake of share in MBO belonged to government or belonged to other 
companies. If S0E_SHARE=1, it means this stake belonged to the government before 
MBO; if it belonged to other companies, SOE_SHARE=0. 
With the above definition, we can divide the whole sample into two subgroups based 
on each variable, and test the means of Pricing for the two groups to see whether they 
are different. The simple t-test result and a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
result are given in Table II-7 
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[Insert Table II-7-1 here] 
For TRA_STYLE, both tests could reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance 
level. The Mean Equality Test results above show that the two subgroups have 
significant differences in mean of Pricing. Specifically if MBO is completed by the 
acquisition of block stock shares of Holding Company, the pricing is much lower than 
MBOs that are completed by the acquisition of block stock shares of listed company 
directly. That means a more serious underbidding problem and the managers are 
enjoying a greater discount in payment. The reason is that the transfer of stock shares 
of a listed company may face much more strict regulations than the transfer of stock 
shares of Holding Company which usually are not listed. Therefore, when managers 
acquire Holding Company in a market that has much less monitoring, they could 
acquire the Holding Company to control the listed company at a price rather lower 
than that when they acquire listed companies directly. Therefore managers could earn 
more abnormal revenue in the MBO transaction merely from the underbidding. 
For the TIMNG factor, here the t-test result shows that we can reject the hypothesis 
that the means of two subgroups are equal at the 10% level. However the 
nonparametric test could not reject the null hypothesis. And we can see that for MBO 
transactions that occurred after March 2003, the pricing is around 0.95，which is much 
higher than 0.74，the mean of pricing of MBOs occurring before March 2003. Since 
the nonparametric test has fewer requirements for the data sample, here we tend to 
trust the Wilcoxon test result. 
Moreover, considering that the new regulations are mainly put on the listed 
companies, it may have more impact on direct MBOs. So we also narrow our focus 
here to test the TIMING factor impact of the pricing for direct MBOs. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test results are given in Table II-7-1. 
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[Insert Table II-7-1 here] 
From both results we can see for direct MBOs, the TIMING factor does have 
significant impact on pricing, which means that the new regulation has some effect on 
the MBO pricing process. For direct MBO after 2003，the pricing gets much higher. 
However, the pricing for Holding Company MBO is still lacking regulation. We will 
reexamine the variable in the later multivariate test. 
For SOE_SHARE factor, the t-test result shows that at the 10% level, we could reject 
the null hypothesis that they are equal. But the nonparametric test is not significant. 
We can see that for SOE MBO, the mean of Pricing (0.73) is much lower than that of 
Non-SOE MBO group (0.92). This provides some evidence that in SOE, managers 
may really use its unique control right over the company to acquire the company at a 
much lower price. That is, in MBOs, SOEs are often sold cheaper than Non-SOEs, 
although the difference is not so significant. 
In a summary, in the simple analysis of Transaction Variables' impact on 
underbidding, we could find significant influence of transaction style and transaction 
time on underbidding. For MBO by acquisition of Holding Company, SOE, and MBO 
before the 2003 new regulation by Ministry of Treasury, the Pricing is lower and the 
underbidding problem is more serious. 
5.1.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
Besides variables concerning the characteristics of the MBO transaction process, 
some corporate governance variables should also be taken into consideration when we 
want to dig into the underbidding problem. 
BHShare is the dummy variable indicating whether the company has issued B or H 
shares. BHShare=l means the company has issued B or H shares, while BHShare=0 
means the company is only listed in the A share market. If the company has been 
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listed in the B share market or in Hong Kong market where there are many foreign 
investors, it is assumed that the corporate governance level will be much higher than 
companies with only A share listing, because the standards and regulation for 
corporate information disclosure and auditing are higher. With the definition of 
BHShare variable, we could test whether B or H share issues could have some impact 
on pricing in the MBO of the company. 
As board of directors is the main force internally in a company to monitor and 
supervise the performance of managers, the power of directors is very important in 
detecting the possible faults in the operation. If in the company the general manager 
or CEO serves the chairman of board of directors, then the board meeting is unlikely 
to oppose the decisions of managers because of the chairman's strong influence on the 
board members especially in the MBO transactions. Thus we use Chair一GM variable 
to indicate whether the chairman of the board and the general manager were the same 
person right before the MBO transaction year. Chair_GM equals 1 if the general 
manager also served as the chair of the board of directors right before the MBO year 
and equals 0 if not. 
With the definition of BHShare and Chair—GM，we can divide the whole sample by 
each variable, and test the equality of Pricing for the pair of subgroups. Both t-test and 
nonparametric test results are given in Table II-8 
[Insert Table II-8 here] 
For BHShare, according to the result we could not reject the hypothesis that the 
means of Pricing in the two groups are equal. Also we need to notice that all the 4 
sample firms with BHShare=l have just issued B shares. So the B or H share issues, 
especially B share issue may not have significant impacts on the pricing in MBO. 
For Chair_GM, the above result shows that the difference in the means of Pricing for 
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the two subgroups is not significant at conventional levels. Therefore whether the 
CEO worked as Chairman of board of directors may not significantly alter the pricing 
in the company's MBO process. 
Additionally, Independent directors also play a very important role in the decision 
making process of the board of directors. Because they are from outside company, 
they are unlikely to be influenced by the managers or the biggest shareholders. If the 
independent director's power is strong enough, the director board may be more able to 
monitor and detect the faults of managers. Thus we define IndJDir—Percent to 
measure the percent of independent directors in the board. If independent directors 
consist of a higher proportion of the board, the company is likely to have better 
corporate governance. 
The control power of the largest shareholder is also what we are interested in. Since in 
most MBO cases, the general managers also serve as the manager or director in the 
Holding Company or the largest shareholder of the target company. Therefore the 
control power of the largest shareholder may have some influence on the MBO 
process, especially in pricing of MBO because the managers could make use of their 
impact in the Holding Company to influence the MBO pricing process of the target 
company. Here we consider the largest shareholder's shareholding of the company. 
To better measure the control power of the largest shareholder, we follow the 
conventional way to use a Control—Power variable to show the absolute control of the 
largest shareholder. Control_Power is defined as: 
Control _ Power=log Lst_Shareholder^ 
Using Ind_Dir_Percent and Control_Power as independent variable separately we run 
a simple OLS regression to find the basic impact of Ind_Dir_Percent and 
Control_Power on Pricing. The simple regressions on the corporate governance 
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factors are given in Table 11-9 
[Insert Table II-7-1 here] 
From the above simple regression results, we can see that coefficient for 
Ind_Dir_Percent is significant at the 10% level. The coefficient is -0.81，which is 
negative. This means that a higher ratio of independent directors in the board directors 
may even lead to a lower price in MBO transactions, which is quite contrary to our 
intuition that better corporation governance could mitigate the underbidding problem. 
We will reexamine this effect in the later multivariate regressions. 
The result also shows a significant (at the 5% level) negative coefficient on 
Control_Power, which means the larger control power the largest shareholder has, the 
cheaper price the managers could get in MBO. This reveals that underbidding is more 
or less similar to other means of tunneling for the largest shareholder, or 
representatives of the largest shareholder (managers in MBO) to benefit themselves at 
the expense of the listed companies. 
In a conclusion, in the simple analysis for the corporate governance variables, a strong 
impact on pricing is found on the proportion of independent directors in the board and 
the largest shareholder's control power over the listed company. Specifically a higher 
proportion of independent director in the board may lead to a lower pricing in MBO. 
Meanwhile a stronger control power by the largest shareholder may facilitate the 
managers to get a better discount in MBO. Later we will reexamine the effects in the 
multivariate regressions. 
5.1.3 Regional Variables 
Considering the great regional difference in development and market maturity, we 
think it will be reasonable to assume a great difference in MBO behaviors for 
companies registered in different provinces. Therefore regional governance factors are 
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what we are next interested to discuss. Here all the regional governance indices are 
from Fan and Wang (2004). 
To measure the marketization level of the regional economy, we select the index 
showing the ratio of economic resources allocated by the market. This index is named 
as Market一Allocation. A higher Market—Allocation index means the region is more 
marketized in the resources allocation process. 
Similarly, the index on the local protection of the product market is also included in 
the study. The index on the efforts of reducing local protection on the product market 
is named as Reduce_Protection. The higher Reduce—Protection is, the less local 
protection should be. 
We also consider the foreign investment as a variable that shows the regional 
economy level. So Foreign—investment shows the government's effort to introduce 
foreign investment. 
The data description of the regional governance factors are given in Table 11-10. 
[Insert Table 11-10 here] 
Next we will use each variable working as independent variable separately to run 
OLS regressions to see the basic impact of regional governance variables on pricing 
rate in MBO. The dependent variable is Pricing. The result is given in Table 11-11. 
[Insert Table 11-11 here] 
From the results we could see that the coefficients for the regional governance 
variables are not significant at conventional level in the simple regressions. Next we 
will use multivariate regression to dig further into this issue. 
5.1.4 Multivariate Regressions: 
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Next we will apply multivariate regression methods to analyze a pool of different 
variables on Pricing parameter and to determine the key factors in Pricing 
determination. We include all the above variables to serve as independent variables. 
The dependent variable is still the Pricing. Also we include total asset and ROA as the 
control variables. We use stepwise inclusion strategy to select the best regression 
model that could explain the pricing rate in MBO samples. The whole results are 
given in Table 11-12. 
[Insert Table 11-12 here] 
Finally the multivariate regression yields Model 10 as the most suitable regression for 
the pricing in MBO. The final regression is: 
Pr icing = 0 .838***-0.518*** yJra _ style + 0.031 x Market _ Allocation + 0.013 x ROA, 
The Adjusted R-Square is 0.342, and all the coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 15% level. Although Market—allocation and ROA are not significant at the 10% 
level, we still include them to try to interpret the pricing process. The interpretation of 
the multivariate regression results is given below: 
Tra—style variable shows that for the two kinds of MBO concerned, if the managers 
could complete the buy-out through acquiring the control right of the Holding 
Company, they could get a lower price and a higher discount. This is largely 
attributed to the less monitoring and regulations for the unlisted companies. 
No corporate governance variables could enter these regression results, which means 
that generally better corporate governance structures can not impact the pricing 
process in MBO. A higher proportion of independent directors and controlling power 
of the largest shareholder both can not affect the managers' attempts to get the control 
power of the company. 
Conversely, we can see regional governance variables play significant roles in the 
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pricing decisions. 
Market一allocation measures the percent of resources that is allocated by the market. It 
could generally reflect the regional market maturity level and government 
intervention level. Our results show that for a region with more matured market that is 
less intervened by the government, the MBO pricing tends to be higher. 
Since the previous discussion has shown that a company with a higher ROA is more 
likely to become MBO target, here the ROA coefficient shows that a company with a 
higher ROA is more likely to get a higher pricing. This is reasonable and intuitive, 
although noticeably this higher pricing is still far below the fair price. 
Finally a significant constant term shows the fixed effects for MBO underbidding. 
This section answers the question of whether underbidding really existed in the 
China's MBOs. Then a multivariate regression reveals what affects the underbidding 
rate in the MBO process. We detect a strong impact of transaction style, market 
allocation efficiency, and the ROA-based firm performance. 
The whole results show that even with a stricter regulation on MBO stock transfers, 
managers still pay much less than the net asset value criterion. Then it is natural to ask, 
how could these transactions get the permission from the government, especially for 
those SOE MBOs? 
The very first reason, we can see from the analysis, is that around a half of our 
samples are MBO through Holding Company. Since in the Chinese stock market 
history, many companies just choose a portion of their most profitable business to set 
up a subsidiary and go public, in order to raise funds to help the Holding Company. 
Therefore the Holding Company only contains very little net assets or even becomes 
just a shell company. And when calculating the net asset value of the holding 
company, the value of control right over the listed companies is disregarded. 
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Therefore by Holding Company MBO the managers could acquire the control right 
over listed companies without paying the relevant sum of money. 
Additionally, it is very usual that some special discounts are given to MBO managers. 
For example, usually if managers could pay back the money in a lump-sum style, a 
further 10% discount is usually given to them. This kind of discount is really 
unreasonable for pricing of such big companies and causes the managers to bear 
further lower costs in MBOs. 
What is more, other factors of SOE also need to be considered in the SOE MBO. For 
instance, in the SOE, all the workers could enjoy some of social welfare provided by 
the enterprises, such as cheap education for children, cheap medical care, etc. They 
are treated as the workers of the nation so they are unlikely to be fired. When the 
company is bought out by the managers, all the social welfare and benefits are gone. 
Then the government shareholders need to pay some compensation for the SOE 
employees to become non-SOE employees. Usually this compensation is not given 
directly to the employees, but is deducted from the net asset value of the target 
company. However, it is really difficult to decide and calculate how much should be 
compensated to the employees according to their working ability, their contribution to 
the company, and the welfare they lose in the MBO process. Therefore the calculation 
of this compensation is highly manipulated by the negotiation power of managers. 
And also we need to notice that the intuition of this compensation deduction from the 
net asset value means that the managers now have the responsibility to take care of 
employees and pay them the corresponding compensation. However this is rarely the 
case. The managers do not have to pay this money as long as the employee is not fired. 
In sum, the deduction of compensation for the employees provides managers with 
excellent chances to manipulate the MBO pricing. 
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Here we will give an example to show how this kind of underbidding transaction 
could be completed. Shenzhen Huaqiang (Stock code: 000062) is controlled by the 
Huaqiang Group that holds 52.5%. Guangdong Government owned the full stock of 
Huaqiang Group. Huaqianghefeng Investment Co. Ltd (Referred to as 
Huaqianghefeng) is a company owned by the employees of Shenzhen Huaqiang. On 
Sept 29^ 2003, Guangdong Government signed a contract with Huaqianghefeng to 
sell the stock shares of Huaqiang Group. The Government sold 45% of Huaqiang 
Group to Huaqianghefeng, and another 46% of Huaqiang Group to 10 managers of 
Shenzhen Huaqiang. Therefore it is an MBO attempt. The NAV of Huaqiang Group is 
539499.8 thousands RMB. However after deduction of the compensation for the 
on-job employees, and the retired employees, and bonus and management fees, the 
remained NAV is only 225552.7 thousands RMB. This stake of 91% percent shares is 
worth 205252.9 thousands RMB. At last if the managers paid in a lump-sum style, 
another 10% discount was given to the managers. So finally the managers only paid 
184727.6 thousands for MBO. Nevertheless, the control right over the listed Shenzhen 
Huaqiang equals 91%* 52.5%*NAV of Shenzhen Huaqiang. 
In 2002 and 2003, the NAVPS of Shenzhen Huaqiang is 4.41 and 4.49 RMB. Using 
the average, the NAV of Shenzhen Huaqiang is: 
(4.41+4.49)*0.5*270400，000 shares=1203280 thousands RMB 
So the control right over the listed company is worth: 
91%*52.5%*1203280=574867 thousands. 
Therefore the managers paid 184727.6 thousands to get a control right over the listed 
company that is worth 574867 thousands. This example may to some extent show 
how the transaction could occur. 
Finally we also need to point out that the government's regulation on the 
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net-asset-value-based pricing intends to entrench the state-owned asset. But this 
intention is far behind the modem corporate governance theory now. Especially for a 
fast developing country like China, how much the company has now is not as 
important as the future growth. In China the annual GDP growth rate exceeds 9% on 
average. Selling the company at NAV based prices while overlooking other factors 
that indicate the future growth means offering the managers an excellent investment 
opportunity. In many cases, after MBO, the excellent performance of listed companies 
could in turn provide high dividends for the managers (shareholders), with which the 
managers could easily pay back the debt they borrow in MBO. As the result, the real 
cost of managers in MBO is even lower. 
In the next section we will turn to another very important issue in MBO, that is, the 
performance analysis for the MBO firms. 
5.2 Performance Analysis 
Performance improvement is also what attracts scholars' attention, especially in China, 
when MBO is considered as an important option for the reform of state-owned 
enterprises. If we assume SOE reform policy is efficient, then MBO firms should 
perform better after MBO in the longer term. 
5.2.1 Control Group Matching 
To compare the effects of MBO on performance, we need to control for other possible 
important factors. To select a control group we basically could follow the Barber and 
Lyon (1996) methods. Their methods focused on similarity in performance and 
industry simultaneously. In Du and Rui (2007)，they further extend the method to 
include the similarity in size and year correspondence in the matching process. Finally 
with regard to the case in our study, the matching criteria are determined by the 
similarity in performance, size, and industry in the given year. 
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Our control group is selected from listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets that are not involved in any kind of MBO activities, i.e. the company name 
does not appear in any kind of MBO news. We also pay attention to some companies 
in our sample that appear in some MBO literature but we could not find the exact 
evidence. Those companies are still excluded from our control group selection. The 
matching process is run by the following steps: 
1. We identify our MBO samples. We decide a MBO year T for each MBO company. 
For MBOs that take more than one year to complete, we generally decide T to be 
the final completing year of MBO process. 
2. We match each MBO company with companies that are similar in performance, 
size and within the same industry as MBO company in year T-1, that is the year 
before the MBO year. Similarity means the difference in performance and size 
(measured by total assets) of the match company and MBO company is less than 
土 20o/o. If there are no matching firms found, we will expand the filter to 25%, 
30%, etc, until a matching firm is found. If more than one matching firms are 
found based on the same criteria, we will select the one that has the least 
difference in total assets as the matching company. 
3. If when the filter expands to 士 30o/o，we still could not find a match in the same 
industry, we will choose the one with the smallest difference in total assets as the 
matching company even if they are not in the same industry. 
With this matching process, most of the MBO sample firms could find a matching 
company in the 30% filter. Finally we get 64 sample firms of MBO companies and 64 
samples of matching firms. The description statistics for MBO companies and 
matching companies are given in Table III-l 
[Insert Table III-l here] 
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The summary statistics shows the similarity in size and performance for our MBO 
firms and matching groups. Next we will use these two groups to run a Difference in 
Difference (DID) estimation to test the performance improvement for MBO firms. 
5.2.2 DID Estimation 
Difference in difference estimation is widely used in panel data analysis, especially in 
policy analysis to estimate the effects of reforms or implementation of new policies. 
In our study we could have two groups of sample firms. One is the group for MBO 
firms, and the other is the group for matching firms that exhibit a similarity in 
performance, size, and industry with the MBO firms. We could also divide the whole 
sample periods into periods before MBO and periods after MBO. Therefore we could 
do the DID estimation. The simple DID estimation model is given by: 
y = c + p^dt + p^dmbo + dmbo) + u 
In the model, y is the dependent variable which we are interested in. Here y will be 
some performance variables for the firms, dt is a dummy for time which equals 1 if 
time is after MBO, and equals 0 if time is before MBO. dmbo is a dummy for MBO 
which equals 1 if the company is bought by the managers, and equals 0 if not. The 
interplay part (dt*dmbo) is the dummy that shows samples for MBO firms after the 
MBO transaction. The coefficient 5 is the effect of MBO on firm performance. If 
we assume y^ ^^  and y^^ are average performance for MBO firms and non-MBO 
firms before MBO. Similarly 少 , and , are average performance for MBO and 
non-MBO firms after MBO. Then the OLS estimation § should be: 
S = (3Vi-_)Vo) — (X,’i-;Vo) 
Therefore the estimation of 5 could represent the effects of MBO on firm 
performance while we exclude other factors such as time. 
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Generally we define three kinds of performance variables to be tested. The definitions 
are listed below. 
ROAl=Incomes from Main Operation/ Total Assets 
ROA2=Total Profits/ Total Assets 
R0A3=Net Profits/Total Assets 
Since MBO is expected to mitigate agency costs, we also consider the operation cost 
to be a dependent variable. Here we define expense rate (ER) to approximate the cost 
rate of the company. 
ER=Operation Expense/Total Assets 
Moreover, we also consider longer stock performance as our analysis target. So we 
also include year-end stock price as our target. Here we define: 
Stock Price=the closing stock price at the end of the year. 
With our data sample, we first compare the two groups' performance improvements in 
different time span from 1 year to 5 years. We run the DID estimation, the results are 
given in Table III-2. 
[Insert Table III-2 here] 
The estimation results, however, show no significant coefficient for dt*dmbo variable 
at conventional level. Moreover, if we look at the t-statistics, we can find that when 
we use ROA2 and R0A3 as performance measures, the estimated coefficients are 
more significant compared with other performance indicators. However, for the 
coefficients of these two variables, they are positive in the next three years after MBO, 
but soon become negative four years after MBO, which means the performance of 
MBO firms may even deteriorate in a longer term. The stock performance comparison 
shows no significant difference between the MBO group and the matching group. 
Additionally, since in the last multivariate regressions we found significant impact of 
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transaction style on MBO pricing, here we may also want to know whether the MBO 
transaction style has some kind of impact on the firm performance. Next we will pick 
out two kinds of main MBO types, direct MBO and Holding Company MBO, and use 
difference-in-difference estimation separately for the two types to show the possible 
impact of MBO on the firm performance. Here the estimation method is almost the 
same. We only change our estimation sample to the two types of MBO firms. The 
estimation result is in Table III-3-1 and Table III-3-2. 
[Insert Table III-3-1 here] 
[Insert Table III-3-2 here] 
From the result, we can see that for direct MBO, the DID estimation is almost the 
same with the previous whole sample estimation. For the estimation of R0A2 and 
R0A3, the coefficients are positive in the first three years of MBO, but become 
negative later. However in the estimation of Holding Company MBO, the result 
seems a little interesting. We can see that the coefficients are positive in the first three 
years of MBO, but become negative in the next two years. It is more interesting that 
in the estimation of R0A3, the coefficient 5 is positive and even significant at 5% 
level in T+4. This may demonstrate that for Holding Company, MBO may have some 
positive impact on firm performance. But noticeably, this improvement is still not so 
sure since only one estimation shows a significant result and also the sample size is 
too limited if we only considered the Holding Company MBO. The stock 
performance of both the two subgroups does not show any significant difference 
between the MBO samples and the matching firms. 
In conclusion, we could find that right after the MBO year, MBO groups could 
display some improvements in total profits and net profits compared with controlling 
group, although the improvements are not significant. However this minor 
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improvement still disappears three years after the MBO year. My interpretation of this 
phenomenon is that the managers may manipulate the performance report after MBO 
in T+1 to receive higher dividends from the listed companies to pay back the debt of 
MBO. In later years, however, the MBO structure could not improve the profits of the 
company anymore so that the performance goes back to normal, especially for the 
direct MBO firms. The Holding Company MBO samples show some improvements in 
net profit in T+4，but the significance only occurs in one year. Therefore basically we 
could decide that the performance improvement for the whole MBO sample is very 
insignificant in the longer term. For the Holding Company MBO, there may be some 
improvements, but we still need further evidence to support. 
5.2.3 Long-term Performance Comparison 
Basically, our above analysis shows that after MBO, MBO companies could not have 
a significant improvement in performance. So it is very natural to compare the 
performance before and after MBO in a longer period. Next we will carry out the 
performance comparison from T-5 to T+5. In the ten years span, we use two groups 
comparison to show the difference between MBO and non-MBO firms in 
performance. The two groups are the same as in the last part. 
Here we focus on four performance variables: ROA, Div, Expense, and Leverage. The 
definition of the variables is given below: 
ROA=Net Profits/ Total Assets, which shows the return of asset of the firm. 
Div=Dividends payable/ Total Assets, which shows the dividends payment of the 
firm. 
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Expense= Operation Expenses/ Total Assets, which shows the cost rate of the firm. 
Leverage:Long-term Debt/ Total Assets, which show the debt ratio of the firm. 
We compare the four variables in the two groups of MBO and non-MBO firms. Both 
t-test and nonparametric test results are given in Table III-4. In the table, the term Dif 
equals the mean of MBO group minus the mean of matching group. So if Dif is 
positive, the MBO group is higher than the matching group. If Dif is negative, then 
the MBO group is lower. 
[Insert Table III-4 here] 
From the results, we can get some interesting findings. In T-4 and T-3, three to four 
years before MBO, the MBO firms have better ROA, which is also consistent with 
our previous finding that firms with better performance are the main targets of MBO. 
In this period, expense rate and leverage are not found significantly different between 
the two groups. However, in T-2 to T, around two years before MBO, the previous 
better performance totally disappears. Conversely, MBO firms began to experience a 
significantly higher expense rate. During all the time before MBO the dividend ratio 
of MBO firms is lower than matching firms, although not significant. After MBO, 
MBO firms have better ROA in T+1, but the difference soon disappears after T+2 and 
never occurs again. In T+3 and T+4 the means of ROA of MBO firms even become 
lower than matching firms. But it is interesting that although the performance is not 
significantly better improved, the dividend ratio of MBO firms becomes higher than 
matching firms from T+1. This could provide some evidence that the better ROA in 
T+1 is mainly attributed to the managers' dividends incentives. On the other hand, the 
significance of higher expense rate of MBO firms last to T+5. Additionally MBO 
firms are having lower leverage ratio from T+3, and this trend also lasts to T+5. 
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So in a summary, the change in ROA tells us that for an original better performing 
firm, the performance excellence vanishes before MBO, which may be due to the 
managers' manipulation of profits to lower down the costs of buy-out. After MBO, 
the ROA is only significantly higher in T+1 for MBO firms. This may be attributed to 
the managers' incentive to get higher dividends to pay back the debt in MBO, which 
is also partly proved from the dividend ratio increase for MBO firms after year T, 
although not significant. Later, MBO firms are not better in performance. Part of the 
reason for the performance comparison could be found from the expense rate and 
leverage ratio. We can see the expense rate is higher for MBO firms since T-1, which 
shows that MBO can not lower down the operation expenses of the company. And a 
lower long-term debt rate shows that MBO firms become more conservative in 
operation and can not utilize much external capital to expand the production. 
5.2.4 Comparison with other M&A 
In the above Difference in Difference test, we compare the performance improvement 
of MBO firms compared with non-MBO firms with no specific features. If we want to 
dig further into the issue, we would be interested in analyzing the firm performance 
improvement compared with firms that have relative Merger& Acquisition activities. 
We want to analyze that compared with other M&A activities, whether MBO could 
cause significantly greater improvements in the firm performance. 
The basic method is similar. First we need to select a matching group for our MBO 
samples. These matching companies should have some kind of merger or acquisition 
activities of equity in the same year as the MBO year T，and should be similar in size 
and performance with MBO companies. We utilize the CSMAR M&A through 
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negotiated equity transfer database. So the only selection process difference is that 
matching group is selected from the company pool with M&A activity. Additionally 
to get enough matching pairs, we expand the filter of similarity to 士 40o/o. Finally we 
could get 51 matching companies to match with 51 of our MBO samples. So 102 
firms will be used in the Difference-in-Difference tests here. 
Similarly with the previous analysis, we still focus on the performance index such as 
return of asset, and the expense. The four variables that are tested in DID test are the 
same as in the previous part. 
ROAl=Income from Main Operation/ Total Assets 
ROA2=Total Profits/ Total Assets 
ROA3=Net Profits/Total Assets 
ER=Operation Expenses/Total Assets 
We compare the performance improvements in different time span from 1 to 5 years. 
From all the results, we still can not find a significant coefficient on dt*dmbo. That 
means in the performance comparison with companies having some M&A activities, 
we still could not find significant improvements for the MBO companies. In other 
words, MBO is no better than other M&A activities. 
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Chapter VI. Conclusions 
Since the heated debate on MBO in China in 2003, the issue has been discussed in 
various literatures. The great disputes on whether MBO firms are sold too cheap and 
whether MBO firms could improve the performance given China's conditions is what 
we are interested in. 
Using the latest sample data on MBO, we first obtain some features of MBO firms. A 
better performing firm, especially small or middle size company with a more 
diversified shareholding structure is more likely to become an MBO target. 
We find that although the government has put more regulations on MBO, still there 
are some problems. The commonly used NAV based pricing, although totally 
overlooks the future cash flow and earnings, are still not implemented thoroughly. 
Managers are still acquiring the target at a 20% discount based on net asset value on 
average. This large underbidding is determined by the transaction style, the regional 
economy marketization level, and the firm ROA. Although the coefficients of 
Market—allocation and ROA are only significant at the 15% level, the results could 
provide some evidence on the pricing process. 
On the other hand, by comparing with the matching groups of common listed firms, 
we could not find significant evidence on MBO effects on the firm performance 
improvements. When we look at different MBO styles, we find that for the Holding 
Company MBO, the performance has some significant improvement in the year T+4. 
But since only one variable in one year shows some significant difference, it is still 
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too early to decide that the Holding Company MBO may benefit the firm performance. 
We may use further samples to discuss the issue in the future analysis. Additionally, 
when we compare the performance of MBO firms with other matching M&A firms, 
still no significant performance improvement of MBO firms could be found. 
Conversely the previous better ROA of MBO firms before MBO even disappears after 
MBO while the expense rate of MBO firms is significantly higher. Therefore we 
could conclude that MBO is no better than other M&A activities and MBO could not 
significantly improve the firm performance. 
With regard to the above two points, for the government, MBO in China should be 
reconsidered, especially when it is applied to SOE reform. Several policy advices 
could be made. 
1. The government officials need to change the attitudes towards MBO. Since MBO 
once was an important option for SOE reform, some governors may have the 
impression that selling SOEs to their managers is a way to reform SOEs and improve 
the efficiency. Therefore MBO once could be considered as administrative 
achievements of the governors. As a result, officials may try to facilitate the MBO 
transaction. However now after years of trials and tests, it is proved that MBO is not 
the best way for SOE reform at least. Although it could be considered, MBO can 
never be considered as success or achievements of regional governors. The 
government should have an objective understanding of MBO and its impact on the 
firm performance. 
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2. The transaction process should be monitored more strictly; especially the pricing 
and negotiation process should be more transparent and subject to competition. The 
detailed transaction price and payment arrangements should be open and put under the 
monitoring of the public. Another more efficient way of pricing is to induce 
competition from other external investors. The bidding information should be put on 
national financial newspapers to introduce more interested investors to bid for. The 
explicit bidding buyouts will surely mitigate the underbidding problem. 
3. No matter theoretically or practically, pricing based on net asset value only without 
considering the other important factors is unreasonable. Additionally NAV is a highly 
manipulated variable in a country without a developed accounting system like China. 
Therefore a more advanced valuation scheme is urgently needed which includes P/E 
ratio, NPV, and predicted growth, etc. And other important market agency such as 
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Tables and Charts 
Table I-l MBO categories 
The table shows the categories of our MBO samples, and the number of samples in each category. 
Category Sample Percent 
1. Direct MBO 23 29.11% 
2. Holding Company MBO 32 40.51 % 
3. Gradual MBO 4 5.06% 
4. Subsidiary MBO 5 6.33% 
5. MBO (unclear) 8 10.13% 
6. MBO Uncompleted 7 8.86% 
Total 79 100% 
Table 1-2 Industry Distribution of MBO samples 
"Sample" is the number of MBO firms in the given industry. "Percent" shows the percentage of 
the companies in the industry that are MBO firms. 
Industry Code Sample Whole Industry Percent 
Agriculture A 4 39 10.26% 
Manufacture C 48 845 5.68% 
Construction E 2 32 6.25% 
Transportation, Logistics F 1 63 1.59% 
Information Technology G 8 93 8.60% 
Commerce H 2 ^ 2.02% 
Real Estate J 3 ^ 6.12% 
Public Utility K 2 ^ 4.76% 
Conglomerates M 8 ^ 9.76% 
Electric D 1 61 1.64% 
Total ^ 
Table 1-3 Stock Exchange Distribution 
Stock Exchange Sample Percent 
Shenzhen 30 37.9% 
Shanghai 49 62.0% 
Total 79 100% 
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Table 1-4 Features of MBO firms 
The table shows the comparison in total assets, ROA, leverage, shareholding and control power 
of the largest shareholder, between MBO firms and all the listed firms. T-test and Rank-sum test 
are reported. 
Mean Mean t for t-test z for 
(MBO) (All Listed) Rank-sum test 
Total Assets 2.23e+09 2.57e+09 0.244 -2.167** 
ROA 0.027 -0.021 -0.933 -2.509** 
Leverage 0.178 0.193 0.592 0.123 
1st Shareholding 37.635 43.888 3.027*** 3.125*** 
Relative—Control 1452.452 2027.583 2.822*** 2.912*** 
Table II-l 
t-test on whether Pricing equals 1. 
t-test for parameter "Pricing" modified, Sample: 46 
Hypothesis: Mean=l, Ha: Mean<l 
t-value - 2 . 7 3 1 " * 
P-value 0.0045 
Sample Mean 0.819 
Sample Std. Dev 0.449 
Table 11-2 ‘ 
Sign-test on whether Pricing=l 
Sign-test for median of "Pricing" modified, Sample: 46 
Hypothesis: Median=l, Ha: Median<l 
Sign Observed Expected 
positive 17 23 
negative 29 23 
zero 0 0 
P-value 0.051 
Sample Mean 0.819 
Sample Std. Dev 0.449 
1— ^ 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
56 
Table II-3 
Wilcoxon Test on whether Pricing=l 




Sample Mean 0.819 
Sample Std. Dev 0.449 
Table II-4 
t-test on whether Pricing—Stock=l 
t-test for parameter "Pricing Stock，，’ Sample: 46 
HO: Mean=l’ Ha: Mean<l 
t-value -15.024*** 
P-value 0.000 
Sample Mean 0.337 
Sample Std. Dev 
Table II-5 
Sign-test on whether Pricing Stock=l 
Sign-test for median of “Pricing一Stock”，Sample: 46 
Hypothesis: Median=l, Ha: MediaiKl 
Sign Observed Expected 
positive 1 23 
negative 45 23 
zero 0 0 
P-value 0.000 
Sample Mean 0.337 
Sample Std. Dev 0.300 
1 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table II-6 
Wilcoxon Test on whether Pricing—Stock=l 




Sample Mean 0.337 
Sample Std. Dev 0.300 
Table II-7 Tests on Pricing by Transaction Variables 
We divide the whole sample into two groups based on different transaction variable. Then we test 
whether Pricing in the two groups are significantly different. T-test and Rank-sum test results are 
reported. 
Mean t for t-test z for Rank-sum test 
Tra style=0 1.064 





SOE Share=0 0.918 
一 1.443* 1.583 
SOE_Share=l 0.729 
Table II-7-1 
We divide the direct MBO samples into two subgroups based on Timing, and test whether Timing 
could have significant impact on Pricing for direct MBO. 
For Tra_style=0 Mean t for t-test z for Rank-sum test 
Timing=0 1.001 ^ ^ 
- 1 . 4 5 0 * - 1 . 7 7 5 * 
“ Timing=l L I H 
Table II-8 Tests on Pricing by Corporate Governance Variables 
We divide the whole sample into two groups based on different Corporate Governance variable. 
Then we test whether Pricing in the two groups are significantly different. T-test and Rank-sum 
test results are reported. 
Mean t for t-test z for Rank-sum test 
Chair GM=0 0.802 






1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table II-9 Tests on Pricing by Corporate Governance Variables (con) 
We use each corporate governance variable as independent variable separately and Pricing as 
dependent variable to run simple regression. T-statistic is reported. 
Simple Regression of Pricing on Ind Dir Percent & Control—Power 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistics P-value 
IND_DIR_PERCENT -0.809 0.407 -1.99* 0.053 
Control_Power -0.190 0.083 -2.29** 0.027 
Table 11-10 Descriptions for Regional Governance Variables 
Sample: 46 Mean Median Min Max 
Market—allocation 6.780 2.803 -4.64 9.54 
Reduceprotect 8.685 1.845 2.69 10.29 
Foreign—investment 3.476 2.935 -0.04 8.11 
Table 11-11 Tests on Pricing by Regional Governance Variables 
We use each regional governance variable as independent variable separately and Pricing as 
dependent variable to run simple regression. T-statistic is reported. 
Simple Regression of Pricing on Regional Governance Variables 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistics P-value 
Market_allocation 0.029 0.024 1.24 0.222 
Reduceprotect 0.014 0.037 0.39 0.695 
Foreign—Investment -0.015 0.023 -0.65 0.517 
1 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 11-12 Multivariate Regressions: 
This table is the multivariate regressions results for dependent variable Pricing. The coefficients 
and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. 
Model I 1 I 2 3 4 一 
0.861*** 0.988*** 1.193*** 1.956 
Constant 
(5.62) (3.52) (10.92) (0.92) 
A) Transaction Variables 
-0.503*** -0.495*** -0.523*** -0.466** 
Tra Style 





SOE Share _ � 
— (0.11) 
0.001 
Percent , , � 
(0.16) 
B) Corporate Governance 
0.068 






Control Power , _ 
— (-0.76) 
C) Regional Governance 
0.032 0.038 
Market_Allocation ^^  ^5) (1.09) 
Reduce—Protection 0.010 _0.004 
(0.34) (-0.07) 
Foreign 一 Investment -0.029 -0.024 
— (-1.52) (-0.96) 
D) Control Variable 
-0.023 
Ln (Total—Asset) ( ^ 25) 
0.011 
ROA (1.25) 
Adjusted R-square 0.323 0.281 0.317 0.209 
1 
To be continued 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 11-12 Continued 
Model 5 I 6 | 7 | 8 
1.067*** 1.559*** 1.042*** 1.018*** 
Constant 
(11.01) (2.87) (1.71) 
A) Transaction Variables 
-0.512*** -0.453*** -0.548*** -0.547*** 
Tra Style 
- (-3.80) (-3.73) (-4.16) (-4.21) 
. . 0.100 0.068 
Timing 
5 (0.73) (0.50) 
SOE_Share 
Percent 




Ind Dir Percent 
- - (0.21) 
-0.071 
Control-Power 








Adjusted R-square 0.281 0.293 | 0.289 0.307 一 
I 
To be continued 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 11-12 Continued 
Model I 9 10 I 11 I 12 
~ 1.681 0.838*** 0.853*** 1.140*** 
Constant 
( 5 ^ (9.80) 
A) Transaction Variables 
-0.501*** -0.518*** -0.513*** -0.532*** 
Tra Style 









C) Regional Governance 
“ 0.029 0.031 
Market_Allocation • 明 （丄；^) 




D) Control Variable 
-0.039 
Ln (Total一Asset) ( 0 ^之） 
0.012 0.013 0.015 0.011 
奶 A g ^ (1.26) 
Adjusted R-square 0.30 0.342 0.310 0.326 
1 
To be continued 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table 11-12 Continued 
Model I 13 I 14 | 15 | 16 
0.842*** 1.300** 1 .024*** 1.041*** 
Constant 
(5.48) (2.29) (3.39) (12.59) 
A) Transaction Variables 
-0.484*** -0.478*** -0.522*** -0.514*** 
Tra Style 








Ind Dir Percent 
- — (-0.47) 
-0.066 
Control Power , a o^r� 
- (-0.85) 
C) Regional Governance 
0.034 0.028 0.046 
Market.Allocation (丨 53) (丨明 ( i . sg ) 
Reduce一 Protection -0.033 
_ (-0.72) 
Forei gn_In vestment 
D) Control Variable 
Ln (Total一Asset) 
0.013 0.014 0.010 0.014 
ROA (1.52) (1.56) (1.12) (1.56) 
Adjusted R-square | 0.329 | 0.337 | 0.334 | 0.319 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table III-l 
Summery statistics for MBO firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. D e v . M i n Max 
Income from Main Operation""“^ 1.36e+09”"“2.00e+09 8.98e+07 1.12e+10 
Total Profits ^ 1.22e+08 1.23e+08 8083072 6.81e+08 
Total Assets M 2 . 0 3 e + 0 9 1 . 9 4 e + 0 9 3.40e+08 1.20e+10 
Summery statistics for matching group firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Income from Main O p e r a t i o n ^ 1.16e+09 1.49e+09 l .Ole+08 7.51e+09 
Total Profits ^ 1 . 1 3 e + 0 8 1 . 2 1 e + 0 8 l .Ole+07 7.73e+08 
Total Assets ^ 1 . 9 5 e + 0 9 1 . 6 7 e + 0 9 3.29e+08 9.00e+09 
Table III-2 DID test results 
Coeff is the coefficient of dt*dmbo in the difference-in-difference test. We conduct the test in a 
time interval from 1 year to 5 years, t statistic is reported. 
R O M R O A 2 ROA3 E R Stock Price 
Coeff “ t Coeff ~ t ~ Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
1 year 0.000""“0.00 0 . 0 0 6 _ 0.70 0.005 0.72 0.002 0.19 -0.719 -0.54 
~2 years -0 .019 -0.21 0.022 1.35 0.018 1.28 0.001 0.11 -0.440 -0.38 
3 years 0 . 0 4 2 0 . 3 9 0 . 2 7 5 一 0.96 0.270 0.95 0.009 0.66 -0.126 -0.08 
~4 years -0.062 -0.60 -0.137 -1.53 -0.086 -1.47 0.006 0.40 0.368 0.23 
~5 years -0.047 -0.39 -0.100 -1.49 -0.105 -1.58 0.017 0.90 0.742 | 0.40 — 
1 
‘ * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 1% level 
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Table III-3-1 DID Estimation for Direct MBO firms 
This table shows the DID estimation for direct MBO firms. Coef f i s the coefficient ofdt*dmbo in 
the difference-in-difference test. We conduct the test in a time interval from 1 year to 5 years, t 
statistic is reported. 
ROAl ROA2 ROA3 ER Stock Price 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t “ Coeff t ~ 
1 year .0.076 0.57 0.023 1.70* 0.017 1.34 -0.002 -0.08 -0.665 -0.35 
2 years 0.095 0.68 0.055 1.54 0.042 1.36 0.007 0.29 -1.103 -0.59 
3 years 0.091 0.63 0.891 1.05 0.883 1.04 0.009 0.32 -1.405 -0.61 
4 years 0.096 0.61 -0.295 -1.17 -0.170 -1.04 -0.014 -0.56 -2.100 -0.72 
"5 years 0.122 0.67 -0.237 | -1.27 -0.240 -1.29 -0.012 -0.43 ~ -1.854 ~0 .75 
Table III-3-2 DID Estimation for Holding Company MBO 
This table shows the DID estimation for Holding Company MBO firms. Coeff is the coefficient of 
dt*dmbo in the difference-in-difference test. We conduct the test in a time interval from 1 year to 
5 years, t statistic is reported. 
ROAl ROA2 ROA3 ER Stock Price 
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
1 year -0.047 -0.31 -0.011 -0.99 -0.008 -0.87 0.001 0.05 -1.08 -0.68 
2 years -0.085 -0.55 -0.022 -1.62 -0.018 -1.66* 0.002 0.10 -0.358 -0.24 
3 years 0 . 0 3 0 - 0 . 1 8 -0.015 -0.78 -0.012 -0.83 0.007 0.38 -0.267 0.11 
4 years -0.058 -0.30 0.007 0.44 0.006 0.46 0.027 1.25 0.355 0.20 
J years - 0 . 1 3 7 - 0 . 5 6 0 . 0 4 4 ~ ~ 1.60 0.046 2.04** 0.039 1.36 1.008 0.39 
1 
1 * Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 10% level 
** Significantly different from zero with two-tailed test at the 5% level 
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